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INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code deals first and foremost with the cash flow rights of 
the debtor’s various investors. The immediate cause of most corporate 
bankruptcy filings is a company’s pending inability to pay off its obligations 
that are becoming due. The firm has made promises to pay various parties, and 
it does not have the financial wherewithal to live up to those obligations. It 
lacks the liquidity necessary to continue to service its debt and has either 
defaulted on its obligations or faces imminent default. In short, there is a 
mismatch between the company’s capital structure and its future revenues. 
Restructuring the business’s balance sheet under Chapter 11 is designed to 
address this mismatch between obligations and available resources. The goal is to 
create a capital structure that better reflects the future revenues of the firm. The 
heart of Chapter 11 is the absolute priority rule. It sets forth the conditions that 
must be met for an investor to see her cash flow rights changed over her 
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objection.1 Those holding secured debt can see their principal reduced, the 
interest rates on the debt trimmed, and the term of the loan extended. Unsecured 
debt can be reduced, paid off at pennies to the dollar, or converted to equity. 
Equity can be drastically diluted or even wiped out in full. Specifying the extent 
to which the various parties’ rights can be adjusted over their objection structures 
the bargaining process that leads to a plan of reorganization. 
Over the decades, much ink has been spilled over the extent to which 
there are deviations from absolute priority in practice and the extent to which 
other mechanisms could be implemented that would vindicate the rule.2 
Recently, there has been serious questioning of the wisdom of the Code’s 
strict adherence to absolute priority, with the suggestion that we return to the 
world of relative priority.3 Regardless of which flavor of priority one prefers, 
in every reorganization case the central issue that is the focus of 
reorganization law is how cash flow rights are adjusted—what claims will the 
prebankruptcy investors have against the restructured company? 
The Code deals with cash flow rights in other ways besides adjusting 
investors’ rights to cash flow at the end of the proceeding via a plan of 
reorganization. For example, all rights to receive payments based on prepetition 
debts are stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition.4 Some transfers of 
money made on the eve of bankruptcy can be undone.5 Transactions of the last 
few years can be scrutinized to see whether the debtor received an adequate 
return for property that it has transferred to others.6 The debtor can decide 
 
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). The absolute priority rule is invoked when a class of creditors 
fails to approve their proposed treatment under the plan. If the class agrees, but an individual 
creditor objects, her rights are measured by the so-called “best interests” test. 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012). As a practical matter, in modern reorganization cases, the best interests test 
does not loom large. 
2 For examples of such work, see generally Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayers, A Dilution Mechanism 
for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 (2001); Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic 
Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (2012); Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of 
Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to 
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New 
Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983). 
3 See COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012–2014: 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 208-09 (2014) (suggesting reducing the absolute rights 
of various classes to reduce costs); Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative 
Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 813 (2017) (“Under a regime of relative 
priority, no one has an incentive to fight many of the battles that currently plague Chapter 11.”); 
see also Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preserving Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 806 (2011) (suggesting that the argument for absolute priority actually supports 
an alternative model). 
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (“A petition filed under . . . this title . . . operates as a stay . . . .”). 
5 See id. § 547 (listing the possible conditions for a return of assets). 
6 Id. §§ 544(b), 548. Examples of transactions that can be revisited include the granting of 
intercorporate guarantees and leveraged buyouts. See, e.g., Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 680 F.3d 1298, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2012) 
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whether to continue with transactions in progress.7 All of these situations adjust 
outside parties’ legal rights to receive money from the debtor. 
Bankruptcy law, in contrast, has little to say about control rights over the 
running of the business.8 It by and large allows the existing management to 
remain in charge of the debtor.9 State law vests the ultimate authority over a 
company’s operations with the firm’s board of directors,10 and bankruptcy law 
leaves that structure in place. Boards, in turn, delegate the running of the 
company to the CEO and the executive team, and the Code takes this 
allocation of authority as the baseline for operating the debtor, both during 
the case and afterwards. 
To be sure, the Code modestly curtails the board’s and managers’ sphere 
of autonomy in some situations. To the extent that the managers want to do 
something out of the ordinary, they need court approval. A court must grant 
permission to pay off prepetition suppliers that the managers deem critical to 
the debtor’s continued operations.11 Borrowing money outside of the ordinary 
course of business needs court approval.12 Decisions to sell most or all of the 
assets of the business require the court’s blessing.13 Yet the Code provides 
 
(invalidating guarantees granted by affiliates of the borrower to the lender as fraudulent 
conveyances); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding 
a leveraged buyout to be a fraudulent conveyance). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit 
Management, which held that shareholders that receive a payment through a financial intermediary 
are not protected under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, is likely to cause an increase in such 
attempts to recover funds. See Merit Mgmt. Grp. v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 887 (2018); 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees’ Motion to Recall Mandate at 1, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent 
Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d. 98, No. 13-3992-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2018) (requesting that the Second 
Circuit permit those seeking to recover to pursue their claim from those receiving proceeds from 
the leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit). 
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (“[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or 
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”). 
8 Other countries often give creditors direct control rights. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate 
Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1555-56 (2004) (reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004)) (noting 
the increase in creditor protection in creditor-oriented systems like England and Germany). Creditors 
can protect their rights at the end of the case through voting on the plan of reorganization, though 
management often retains the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization. For an explanation 
of the role that voting plays in Chapter 11, see id. at 1557-59 and see generally David Arthur Skeel, Jr., 
The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992). 
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012) (preserving most of a debtor’s rights to control). Current 
management can be removed “for cause” and replaced by a trustee. Id. § 1104(a). However, such 
removal is rare in large reorganization cases. See Jonathan C. Lipson & Christopher Fiore Marotta, 
Examining Success, AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 37 (2016) (reporting that trustees are appointed in 3.7% of 
large reorganization cases). 
10 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018) (setting all default authority to a board of directors). 
11 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir. 2004). 
12 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
13 See id. § 363(b) (describing the process and requirement for selling assets outside of the 
“ordinary course of business”). 
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little guidance to the bankruptcy judge on how to assess a request when those 
in charge seek the requisite permission. Case law suggests that for major 
transactions, such as the sale of an entire firm, the burden on the managers is 
to articulate a “business justification” for the proposed action.14 On its face, 
this articulation sounds a bit more demanding than the “business judgment 
rule” that effectively insulates most corporate transactions outside of 
bankruptcy from judicial questioning. The increase in scrutiny, however, is 
modest at best. Few cases can be found where the bankruptcy judge rejects 
the justification that the managers put forward. The upshot is that, at least as 
a formal legal matter, control of the company prior to the confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization remains with those who had control prior to the 
commencement of the case. 
There is a change of control rights at the end of the case when a plan of 
reorganization is confirmed. It is not, however, that lenders receive the legal 
authority to make decisions with respect to the deployment of the company’s assets, 
as lenders. Rather, lenders are given new interests in the reorganized company. In 
most cases where the debtor is not sold to a new owner,15 the standard result is that 
shares in the reorganized company are distributed to the prebankruptcy investors. 
They do not go to the old shareholders;16 instead, they go to the former debt 
holders. Precisely how the securities are distributed depends on where in the 
waterfall the value of the company runs out.17 The point is that Chapter 11 does not 
give control rights to creditors. Rather, it changes the creditors (or at least some of 
them) into shareholders.18 
 
14 See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 
1069-70 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that there must be a business justification beyond appeasing 
customers to selling property outside the normal course of business). 
15 A substantial number of Chapter 11 cases today involve selling the debtor. See Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675-76 (2003) (reporting 
that sales comprised over half of the Chapter 11 cases of large, publicly held companies). 
16 Even in cases where the absolute priority was violated in the past, old equity received a very 
small fraction of the new shares. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over 
Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
125, 141-43 (1990) (reporting that in a sample of thirty cases, nine cases had no distribution to equity, 
eleven cases had distributions to equity that were less than or equal to five percent of the distribution 
to unsecured creditors, eight others had distributions that were between five percent and ten percent, 
and in only two cases were the distributions more than ten percent). 
17 On the challenges of valuing a company in a Chapter 11 proceeding, see generally 
Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy, 166 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1819 (2018). 
18 Barry Adler has proposed replacing Chapter 11 with a system that makes such changes 
automatically upon default. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323-24 (1993). Along the same lines, bonds that automatically 
converted to equity upon default have also been proposed. See generally Note, Distress-Contingent 
Convertible Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1857 (1991). Both 
of these proposals have control rights remaining with equity and convert junior debt holders into 
equity holders. In other words, they adjust cash flow rights rather than control rights. 
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However, bankruptcy law does one thing in the area of control rights. It 
abrogates all efforts to parcel out control rights via contract. To the extent 
that the parties have contracted for the debtor to take certain action, the 
debtor can reject the contract.19 Attempts by third parties to exercise control 
over the assets of the estate, even if these parties are otherwise legally entitled 
to take such action, are blocked by the Code’s automatic stay.20 
One can question the Code’s obsession with cash flow rights and the relative 
neglect of control rights. From a societal perspective, getting the right decisions 
as to the deployment of assets matters more than who collects the spoils. 
Control rights in the end determine the size of the pie. Cash flow rights merely 
determine how the pie is sliced. The paramount question facing any enterprise 
is who makes the decisions regarding the future of the business. When scholars 
look at corporate decisions, they have a tendency to focus on the incentives 
caused by cash flow rights. It is undoubtedly true that incentives matter. 
Consider, for example, the issue of executive compensation. Tying a CEO’s 
compensation to the company’s stock price will lead to different outcomes than 
would tying her compensation to the company’s market share. But focusing 
only on incentives elides the question of the quality of the person making the 
decisions. Some folks have better judgment; some are a better fit with the 
organization. To look at it another way, it is not that the CEOs who fail 
necessarily have bad incentives. Tinkering with the terms of a compensation 
agreement would not turn a mediocre CEO into an outstanding one. The 
converse is true as well. A poorly structured compensation package will not 
consign a talented leader to failure. 
The bottom line is that giving someone the best incentives does not give 
them the wisdom to make the right judgments. Having someone in control who 
makes good decisions matters a lot to investors. For example, it is common in 
lending agreements to include a change of control covenant. The typical 
provision provides that a change in a borrower’s leadership constitutes a default 
under the loan. However, it is not that the bank invariably calls the loan when 
such a change is made. Rather, the bank achieved a level of comfort with the 
team that was in charge at the time it made the loan; by having a “change of 
control” provision, the bank can assess whether it has the same level of comfort 
with the new team or whether it wants to terminate the relationship. 
This relative lack of attention to control rights by bankruptcy law has not 
always been the case. At one point, the formal shift of control rights loomed large 
in the law of corporate reorganizations. The Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor to 
today’s Code, paid close attention to control rights. The drafters of the Act 
distinguished between two types of companies: one was the small business. The 
 
19 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). 
20 Id. § 362(a)(3). 
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fate of such an operation, then as now, was tied up with its owner. The company 
may or may not be able to be reorganized successfully. If it was, however, there 
was no doubt that it would be under the control of the prebankruptcy owner. Not 
surprisingly, under the Act’s Chapter XI, the owner/manager remained in charge 
of the business during the restructuring effort. Putting someone else in place 
would make little sense. Outside of bankruptcy there was little separation 
between ownership and control, and there was no reason to cleave the two once 
a bankruptcy petition had been filed.21 
The Bankruptcy Act treated publicly traded firms differently. Such 
businesses were run by professional managers rather than the owners of the 
company. One could easily imagine transferring control over the company to a 
new set of hands. Chapter X of the Act was to be the home for companies 
overseen by professional managers. As the law was originally envisioned, the 
old managers were shown the door when the company filed for reorganization, 
and the SEC would step in and appoint new people to run the company.22 
The drafters of the Chandler Act were acutely aware of who exercised 
control rights. They did not trust the private managers of failed firms (nor 
their lawyers). They viewed public companies as having a public purpose, and 
when these businesses encountered financial difficulty, it seemed only right 
to them to sweep out those who had caused the problem and put in place 
leadership blessed by the government. 
Things did not go as the drafters planned, with small businesses ending 
up in Chapter XI and large public companies in Chapter X.23 Rather, 
businesses large and small sought to reorganize under Chapter XI’s provision. 
The motivation was readily apparent: few managers wanted to sign up for an 
automatic death sentence. The initial tactic was that they would avoid filing 
for Chapter X for as long as they could. Eventually, case law developed so 
that they were able to shoe horn their way into Chapter XI and thus remain 
in control of the business during the bankruptcy proceeding.24 Chapter X 
became something of a relic. 
 
21 Such businesses still make up a sizable portion of Chapter 11 work, at least when measured 
by cases. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business 
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2321-22 (2005) (reporting that in a sample of Chapter 11 
cases, there were 104 small business cases and only two cases where the debtor had a separation of 
ownership and control). 
22 See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 189, 52 Stat. 840, 892 (1938) (allowing the trustee to 
“operate the business”). 
23 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 161-66 
(2001) (describing the history by which public corporations obtained access to Chapter XI). 
24 See Benjamin Weintraub & Harris Levin, A Sequel to Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for 
the Middle-Sized Corporation, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 292, 292 (1957) (explaining that middle-sized 
public corporations were able to file for relief under Chapter XI). 
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The drafters of the Code’s Chapter 11 were well aware of this failed attempt 
to segregate small companies from large ones. Accordingly, they crafted a single 
chapter for all corporate bankruptcy reorganizations. In terms of who would 
run the company during the reorganization effort, the drafters adhered to the 
prevailing practice and selected Chapter XI’s rule of allowing current managers 
to remain in place. Managers embraced this new regime. In the first years of 
Chapter 11, it was common knowledge that the debtor and its prebankruptcy 
management remained in full control of both the business and the 
reorganization effort. Indeed, Chapter 11 was viewed by many as a vehicle by 
which managers could hide from the consequences of their poor decisions.25 
While the formal allocation of control over an enterprise that has filed for 
reorganization has remained the same since the enactment of the Code almost 
forty years ago, the past two decades have seen an increase in the ability of debt 
holders to influence the conduct of the business and the course of the Chapter 11 
proceeding. It is now commonplace for creditors to be the driving force behind 
reorganization efforts. Indeed, some have referred to the current state of affairs 
as “creditor in possession,” a reflection of the fact that the creditors—or at least a 
subset of them—are making the crucial decisions about the future of the business, 
as opposed to the board of directors and the management. 
In this Article, I revisit this state of affairs. Part I assesses how state law 
and investors allocate control rights over a business prior to the onset of 
financial distress. Even in financially healthy companies there is potential for 
tension between the interests of equity holders and debt holders as to the 
course of the business going forward, and this tension can be resolved through 
terms in the lending agreement. Part II examines how creditors in today’s 
environment affect the exercise of control. While they are careful not to put 
their hands directly on the levers of power, these creditors shape the 
business’s future. Part III assesses this state of affairs. While the current 
balance between the rights and powers of debt holders and equity holders 
may be optimal, one can question such a Panglossian proposition. Many 
features of current law shape how the parties allocate control rights. In 
particular, our legal regime makes it difficult for parties to contract directly 
on control rights. If these features were altered, it could open up the 
contracting space and change the lending contracts that now govern the 
relationship between debtors and their investors. 
 
25 See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1043, 1049 (1992) (“We believe that, insofar as corporate bankruptcies are concerned, the 
principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11  . . . are corporate managers.”). 
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I. THE ALLOCATION OF CONTROL RIGHTS OUTSIDE OF 
BANKRUPTCY 
Corporate law vests control rights over the operation of the business with 
the board of directors of the company.26 The board of directors is elected by the 
shareholders, but it would be a mistake to analogize such elections to political 
contests. The board formally nominates a candidate for each position that is up 
for election, often putting the incumbent board members forward. The power 
to nominate in practice translates to the power to appoint. Shareholders 
routinely cast their proxies in favor of those put forward by the board. It is rare 
that the winners of the board election are not those proposed by the board.27 
The recent case of activist investor Nelson Peltz running a successful campaign 
to gain a seat on the Procter and Gamble Board stands out for its uniqueness.28 
In most corporations, the board delegates the control rights over the 
day-to-day operation of the business to the CEO. The CEO, often working 
with the board, fills out the rest of the management team. The board thus 
has the ultimate authority in that it selects the CEO, has the power to fire 
the CEO, and retains final authority over the company’s major decisions.29 
The exact nature of which decisions need to be approved by the board varies 
from firm to firm; generally, the company’s bylaws dictate which decisions 
can be made by management and which need to be made by the board. 
This sharing of control over the business between the board and 
management can be immune from shareholder intervention. Current law 
allows a corporation to adopt structures that insulate a board and incumbent 
managers in their exercise of control rights. Under Delaware law, a company 
can, in its charter, retain the right for the board of directors to issue a poison 
pill in response to a hostile takeover attempt.30 A poison pill, or shareholder 
rights plan, allows existing shareholders to buy new discounted shares should 
 
26 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
27 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688 (2007) 
(“[T]he incidence of electoral challenges by a rival team seeking to run the company better is quite 
small—and successful such challenges are quite rare.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 311 (1999) (“[S]hareholders in public 
corporations do not in any realistic sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves.”). 
28 See Nick Turner & Beth Jinks, P&G Names Activist Nelson Peltz to Board After Proxy Battle, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/ 
p-g-names-billionaire-nelson-peltz-to-board-after-proxy-battle [https://perma.cc/UTN7-93S9] 
(describing Peltz “narrowly” obtaining a “contentious and costly” victory to win a seat on Procter 
and Gamble’s Board of Directors). 
29 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 921, 923 (2007) 
(“[T]he challenge of hiring and firing managers is the single most important job that directors face.”). 
30 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 157 (2018). Even absent such a provision, a board can create 
a poison pill. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (upholding a 
business’s use of a poison pill as a legitimate exercise of its judgment). 
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a potential acquirer obtain a certain level of stockholdings. Crucially, the 
putative acquirer is not offered the discounted shares. The ability to deploy a 
pill makes it difficult for an outsider who has determined that the company is 
not being run effectively to buy the company over the objection of the board. 
Indeed, the entire point of a poison pill is to defeat a hostile takeover. 
But what about replacing the board via elections? If the existing board 
will not entertain an attractive offer for the company, perhaps a new one 
would be more amenable. The company can block this move as well. It can 
structure itself so that its board is staggered. This means that only a minority 
of directors, typically one-third, stand for election each year. Therefore, a 
hostile bidder can only replace a minority through a proxy contest in any 
given year. To the extent that the board unanimously opposes a takeover bid, 
it would take two election cycles for the hostile bidder to gain control of the 
board. The effectiveness of this insulation of control rights from outsiders is 
well established,31 even if there remains robust debate over the social 
desirability of the practice.32 
The market for corporate control, however, is not the only mechanism that 
affects the ability of managers to exercise control rights. Contracting plays a 
role in guiding control rights as well. A lending contract’s primary purpose is 
to set forth cash flow rights. The contracts specify when the borrowed money 
has to be repaid, stipulate the interest rate, and dictate what the effect of default 
will be on those obligations. But they do more than this. Lending contracts not 
only set cash flow rights, but also often provide a basis by which the lender can 
affect and constrain management’s exercise of the control that it enjoys over the 
company. Lending documents, which are far more detailed than corporate 
charters, often run in excess of 100 pages, and many of these provisions relate 
directly to decisions regarding corporate action. For example, it is common for 
a credit agreement to limit how much money a borrower can devote to capital 
 
31 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence, & Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2002) (“A staggered board . . . offers a more powerful 
antitakeover defense than has previously been recognized.”). 
32 Compare K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 71 (2016) (documenting empirically the association between staggered 
boards and significant increases in firm value), and K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and 
Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 443 (2017) (finding that when a certain subset 
of firms—namely those in long-term projects—adopt a staggered board, the value of the firm 
increases), with Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (2013) (“[A]n analysis of the long-term effects of board insulation, 
informed by the relevant theoretical and empirical literature . . . indicates that the overall effect of 
insulation at current or higher levels is negative rather than positive.”), and Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Alma Cohen, Recent Board Declassifications: A Response to Cremers and Sepe 7 (May 1, 2017) 
(unpublished response), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970629 (concluding that 
methodological issues in Cremer’s and Sepe’s studies preclude their papers from drawing valid 
inferences on the effects of staggered boards). 
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expenditures. The lender limits what can be spent on new large projects, 
thereby putting constraints on expansion of the business. The credit agreement 
can also constrain the ability of borrowers to enter new lines of business, borrow 
additional funds, and pledge collateral. The lending agreement may also 
circumscribe the ability of the borrower to make acquisitions or to shift funds 
to subsidiaries in other countries. 
It is important to delineate the legal relationship that the credit agreement 
creates between the lender and the borrower. It is commonplace in the 
literature to describe these contracts as vesting control rights in the lenders.33 
As a legal matter, this characterization is not entirely accurate; the contracts 
do not give lenders direct control rights over the business. The lenders cannot 
take actions that normally fall within the domain of the board: they cannot 
put a company up for sale, require a change of management, or veto a new 
investment that the managers want to make. The formal power over these 
decisions remains with the company, and the lender has no legal right to block 
a duly made decision by the board. No court, in looking at the lending 
contract, would grant a lender’s request to enjoin action that the company 
seeks to take. 
This is not to say that the lenders lack power over the borrower—quite 
the contrary. The point is that the lender has more actual power than legal 
rights. The covenants in the lending agreement effectively give the lender 
veto power over certain actions and allow the lender to exert influence on 
others. The process works as follows: When the borrower violates a covenant 
in the credit agreement, the lender may declare a default under the terms of 
the agreement. The effect of declaring a default is to accelerate the principal 
and make the entire outstanding loan due and owing immediately. The threat 
of acceleration is a powerful one. Few companies have the ability to pay off 
 
33 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 933 (2001) (“The key to the 
success of the equity receivership lay in the control rights given to the investment bankers and their 
need to return to the market in the future.”); Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1758 (2012) (“Given the well-documented set of 
control rights given to the creditors following a covenant violation, we interpret the evidence as 
suggesting that creditors serve a corporate governance role that helps increase the value of the firm.”); 
Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 400, 401 (2009) 
(“Private credit agreements govern the terms of sole-lender and syndicated bank loans to companies, 
and they contain covenants that are more detailed, comprehensive, and tightly set than public bonds.”); 
Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. 
FIN. 1657, 1666 (2009) (“Although the allocation of control rights is an important aspect of these 
models, creditor ‘control’ does not necessarily entail creditors literally replacing managers as decision-
makers.”); Mitchell Berlin et al., Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates 4 
(Mar. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960757 (“The purpose 
of split control rights is not to diminish borrower monitoring but rather to concentrate control rights 
with the revolving lenders.”). 
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all that they owe in full on short notice. Indeed, in cases where the lender 
operates the borrower’s cash management system, the lender can seize all of 
the borrower’s accounts to recover the money it is owed, thereby depriving 
the company of working funds.34 Needless to say, faced with these potential 
consequences, borrowers do their best not to default. 
The way in which lenders have used the covenants in a credit agreement 
to police the actions of the borrower has evolved over time. Covenants used 
to be thought of as purely defensive measures, designed to protect the 
interests of the lenders. The lenders, at the time they extended credit to the 
borrower, understood the business to which they were loaning money. They 
knew the risks that they were taking. Of course, they wanted the business to 
thrive; they expected to get paid out of the revenues that the business earns. 
On the other hand, there was always the chance that managers could change 
the risk profile of the company. For this reason, the lenders wanted to make 
sure that the business did not make fundamental changes without their 
consent. It was not that they thought that they had better ideas about the 
appropriate course of action than those running the business. Indeed, part of 
the decision to make the loan in the first instance was that the lead bank had 
confidence in the management team and its vision for the company. Rather, 
the lenders understood the risk profile that they were accepting when they 
agreed to make the loan, and they wanted to make sure that, if the borrower 
wanted to take actions that would (or could) change that profile, they were 
comfortable with those changes. The lenders did not want to wake up one day 
and find that they had lent money to a very different company than the 
company they had originally signed on to support. 
A change in business focus was not the only risk that lenders traditionally 
guarded against via covenants in the credit agreement. Lenders are acutely 
aware that once cash flow rights are divided among various investors with 
differing claims, those in control may be tempted to take actions that increase 
the return to equity holders, even if such actions would place undue risk on 
the other investors. To use economic language, covenants in this era guarded 
against asset substitution, claim dilution, and dividend payments.35 Asset 
substitution occurs when the managers replace one set of projects with a 
different set that may have the same expected value but greater variance. In 
the extreme, the managers of the company could reduce all the assets to cash, 
fly to Las Vegas, and “put it all on black.” More realistically, the risk is that 
 
34 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1227 (2006) (remarking on the veto power that comes with the 
lender’s complete control of the debtor’s cash flow, internal and external to the corporation). 
35 For the classic work in this area, see generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On 
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979), which delineates the 
risks the debt investors face and how covenants can mitigate these risks. 
1760 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1749 
the company would alter its operations, such as starting a new line of business. 
It is not uncommon that a company has success in one area, leading the 
managers to believe that they have found the secret sauce that can be applied 
to other areas as well. Such expansion can sometimes go well. Other times, it 
can fail spectacularly.36 It is not that lenders bar efforts to improve the 
business; rather, the negative covenants ensure that substantial changes are 
discussed with the lenders and receive their blessing. If the company could 
not get the lender to agree to a proposed expansion, the company would be 
left with the choice of either abandoning the new idea or finding a new lender 
that would be willing to refinance the business, usually paying off the old 
lender in full. 
As with the risk of asset substitution, the risk that claim dilution presents 
a lender is also easy to understand. Claim dilution happens when a borrower 
gets money from a second lender after it has obtained a loan.37 The new loan 
dilutes the first lender’s claim because the first lender now has to compete 
with the second lender for repayment from the borrower. The dilution is even 
more extreme if the second lender is promised to be repaid sooner than the 
first lender or promised collateral that otherwise could have been used to 
satisfy the first lender’s claim. Covenants aimed at prohibiting new borrowing 
and pledging collateral to other lenders are designed to ensure that a lender’s 
claim is not diluted in this manner. 
Dividend payments are perhaps the quickest way to increase the risk of 
nonpayment to a lender. Dividends go directly to the shareholders and do not 
end up in the lenders’ pockets. Most lenders think that the best thing to do 
with available cash that is not needed to run the enterprise is to send it to the 
lenders in satisfaction of what the debtor owes rather than to funnel it to the 
shareholders. It is thus not surprising that credit agreements have terms that 
limit or even prohibit dividend payments.38 
These attempts to constrain borrower behavior at times picked up what 
the lender would ultimately conclude were benign transactions. It is difficult 
to identify in advance with accuracy which future transactions will negatively 
alter the lender’s ability to be repaid. The common approach was to draw 
covenants on the broad side, with the understanding that the credit 
 
36 Enron, for example, had success in creating a market in electricity. It believed that this 
expertise would allow it to create markets in other areas, such as water and broadband. Needless to 
say, the translation from one area to others did not go as well as the leaders had hoped. See Douglas 
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 
1794-1801 (2002) (explaining the problems Enron encountered when trying to extend their energy 
strategy to other industries). 
37 See Smith & Warner, supra note 35, at 136-38. 
38 See id. at 131-35 (analyzing the features of payment-restricting bond covenants). 
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agreement could be tweaked as necessary.39 Indeed, it was common for the 
borrower and lender to reach an agreement to amend the credit agreement or 
agree to waive what would otherwise be a default before a covenant was 
violated.40 Lending agreements tend to run for five or six years, and even the 
best business people, lenders, and their lawyers understand that things can be 
revisited as necessary. 
These negative covenants were not originally designed to give the lender 
control over the decisions that touch on the covenant. Rather, they were more 
analogous to a veto, with both parties understanding that the veto would be 
used judiciously. In terms of setting the constraints, they were broad and 
intentionally overinclusive. It was impossible to identify with precision the 
situations where the lender might become uncomfortable with actions that 
the borrower wished to take. The covenants were meant to identify situations 
that might be problematic and give the lender an advance warning before 
action was taken. The possibility that the borrower would trigger a covenant 
often forced a conversation about the nature of the violation.41 If the lender 
was comfortable with the proposed actions of the borrower, it could either 
waive the default or amend the credit agreement so that the action at issue 
would not be a default.42 These terms were by and large effective in achieving 
the goals of the creditors. As the creditors could not seek an injunction in 
court to specifically enforce the terms, the covenants created incentives for 
the parties to reach common ground on how to move forward. 
In these situations, the terms of the lending agreement and the lenders’ 
willingness to stand on their rights had a large effect on the actions of the 
company. Companies that were not on the same page as their lender were in 
for rocky times. Still, as a matter of positive law, it was the debtor deciding 
what action to take. Control rights remained in the debtor; the lending 
agreement influenced how they were exercised. 
The empirical evidence reveals that these covenants affect company behavior 
well before bankruptcy is on the horizon. In any given year, somewhere between 
 
39 See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate 
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1093-94 (1995) (describing debt covenants as “tripwires for the 
lender’s right to accelerate and enforce or to intervene” well before missed payments or insolvency). 
40 See Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant 
Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 (2002) (finding frequent covenant violations, many not 
caused by financial distress). 
41 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 39, at 1084 (noting that “a borrower usually undertakes to 
advise the bank of any violations of its covenants”). 
42 See Michael R. Roberts, The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in 
Financial Contracting, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62 (2015) (reporting that typical loan has a maturity of 
four and a half years and is amended five times while it is in force). 
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ten and twenty percent of companies violate a covenant in a credit agreement.43 
Violating these covenants has consequences for the operations of the business. 
Violations are followed by decreases in both capital expenditures and cash 
acquisitions of other companies.44 Payouts to shareholders decline as well.45 The 
chance of a CEO being forced out also increases.46 
Over time, the use of covenants as a lever to influence borrower behavior 
has expanded. Covenants have gone from being a shield to a sword. This is 
not so much a change in the way that the lending agreements have been 
written but rather represents a fundamental change with regard to who holds 
the loan. That is, a new type of player has entered the scene. This player has 
come to realize that some covenants originally designed to make sure that the 
borrower did not radically change its business could be used to force radical 
changes—of the lender’s choice—on the borrowers. 
At the extreme, there are those who view the credit agreement as a vehicle 
for acquiring a company, the so-called “loan-to-own crowd.”47 These investors 
arose on the scene in the 1990s and were a result of the change in lending 
markets. There had always been an active secondary market for the public-issued 
debt of a corporation, in part due to the fact that public debt tends to have fewer 
covenants than does private debt. Over the past couple of decades, however, a 
secondary market for private debt has evolved as well.48 
Since the lending crisis of the 1980s, most private loans to large companies 
are no longer made by a single lender.49 Instead, the lead bank—that is, the 
 
43 Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1713, 1725-26 (2012). 
44 See id. at 1736-37 (providing a graph that shows that “financial covenant violations are 
followed by decreases in capital expenditures and cash acquisitions and sharp reductions in the 
growth rate of total assets and PPE”). 
45 See id. at 1740-41 (showing that “total shareholder payouts decline sharply in the quarter after 
the violation and stay low for at least a year post-violation”). 
46 See id. at 1741-46 (providing evidence that while CEO turnover is generally consistent, 
during the quarter after a violation, “the incidence of forced CEO turnovers increases sharply”). 
47 See Bernard Wysocki, Jr., New Breed of Hardball Investors Makes Loans, Takes Control, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116589200646847241 [https://perma.cc/MQ26-AT4p]. 
48 See Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary 
Market for Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 1649, 1650 (2012) (reporting an increase of loan trading on the secondary 
market from about $50 billion to over $300 billion between 1997 and 2008); Kerry Kantin, US 
Leveraged Loan Trading Volume Hits Record $628B in 2014, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 9:13 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/02/05/us-leveraged-loan-trading-volume-hits-record 
-628b-in-2014 [https://perma.cc/KCL8-GNK3]. 
49 On the decline of traditional banks in the area of private loans, see generally Douglas G. Baird 
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 666-71 (2010), which discusses the rise of 
the “syndicated loan,” where “[s]ingle banks no longer make loans to large businesses” and instead one 
bank acts as the leader that “monitor[s] the debtor and oversee[s] the interests of the creditor as a 
group.” For a detailed evolution of syndicated loans, see Yener Altunbaş et al., The Evolution of Syndicated 
Loan Markets, 26 SERV. INDUSTRIES J. 689, 690 (2006). For a general overview of the syndicated loan 
market, see generally STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET (2011), 
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bank that has negotiated the basic framework of the loan with the 
borrowers—puts together a group, or “syndicate,” of banks to make the loan. 
The pieces of the loan are, in effect, parceled out to a number of lenders, with 
each lender funding a portion of the overall borrowing. These lenders can 
include not only traditional banks but also insurance companies and hedge 
funds. Moreover, the initial members of the syndicate can sell their 
participations to any willing buyer.50 
The market in private debt has facilitated the emergence of new investors 
seeking to take control of a distressed firm. These investors buy the debt of a 
distressed company with the aim of using their position as creditors to 
ultimately take over the firm. The investors buy the debt, anticipating that 
they will eventually be able to turn it into equity via a Chapter 11 
reorganization. If the equity of the company becomes highly concentrated 
after the balance sheet is restructured, the distressed investor will end up with 
control of the company. 51 
One response to the rise of nonbank players in the commercial loan space 
has been to differentiate between the term loan and the revolver. Many credit 
agreements consist of a term loan and a revolving credit facility.52 Nonbank 
investors tend to participate in the term portion of the loan, whereas the 
revolver portion of the agreement is funded almost exclusively by banks. A 
central reason for this trend relates to institutional capability: banks are better 
equipped to advance funds quickly when the borrower makes a call on the 
revolver. Most distressed investors, on the other hand, do not have the back-
office capabilities necessary to be part of the revolver. 
In recent years, it has become increasingly common for the covenants of 
the term loan and the revolver to diverge. Moreover, the holders of the 
 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HRX-LK4A]. See also 
Berlin et al., supra note 33, at 2 (“One striking development in the $4 trillion syndicated loan market 
has been the marketing of bank-originated loans to nonbank intermediaries such as hedge funds, 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and mutual funds.”). 
50 One notable exception to this right is the presence of a disqualified-institutions list within 
certain credit agreements. This list comprises potential buyers who have been deemed ineligible to 
own the debt. The types of institutions that appear on these lists are often particularly aggressive 
hedge funds and direct competitors of the borrower. Normally, these restrictions only come into 
force when the borrower is not in default on the loan. See David Griffiths, Barbarians at the Gate: 
Loan Syndications and Trading Association Issues Market Advisory Regarding Disqualified Institutions 
Provisions for Blacklisted Lenders, BANKR. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2015), https://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/financial-markets/barbarians-at-the-gate-loan-syndications-and-trading-
association-issues-market-advisory-regarding-disqualified-institutions-provisions-for-blacklisted-
lenders [https://perma.cc/KCS6-FMU5]; Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, Glossary of Syndicated 
Loan Market Terms, PRACTICAL L. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.lsta.org/document/default/
download/file/a9092950-f706-11e3-a545-5254003c8ea2 [https://perma.cc/83ZA-Z3BS]. 
51 For a discussion of this dynamic, see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 49, at 659-86. 
52 See Berlin et al., supra note 33, at 2 n.4 (reporting that in a sample of leveraged loans, 95% 
of borrowers with a term loan also have a line of credit). 
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revolver have been allowed to both amend its terms without the consent of 
the term loan holders and waive defaults. This structure has prevented the 
holdout game that some investors play in the term loan.53 
Loan-to-own situations, however, are not the only way in which 
investors today seek to gather control rights. Even without engineering a 
complete takeover of a company, new investors can look to make changes, 
such as blocking proposed amendments to the credit agreement. 
Alternatively, they can insist that the company take certain actions before 
they will agree to an amendment. For example, they can engineer the 
appointment of a chief restructuring officer. 
The chief restructuring officer (CRO) is a relatively new player in the 
corporate landscape. To get a sense of the rise and growth of the CRO, it is 
helpful to look at the milestones of the Turnaround Management Association, a 
group of professionals dedicated to working with companies in financial distress. 
The Association did not exist until 1986, and its first seven chapters were created 
in 1991. Membership soon exceeded 1000 by 1992 and passed 5000 by 2002.54 The 
first reported mention of a CRO in a published opinion was 2004.55 
The extent to which a CRO has her hands on the levers of control depends 
on the CRO’s engagement letter. In some situations, the CRO can hire or fire 
employees of the company without the prior approval of the CEO. Regardless 
of whether the CRO reports to the CEO or to the Board, the CRO is a repeat 
player in the world of restructurings and reorganizations. She knows that her 
future employment rests with the lender’s decision to recommend her for 
future gigs. To the extent that she is seen as someone who does not adequately 
prioritize the interests of creditors in exercising control rights, she will not 
get more work. 
The recent increase in the use of covenants to influence company action 
when an enterprise encounters financial distress is not an isolated 
phenomenon. Rather, it is part of a broader trend of investor activism across 
the American economy. Investors now look for companies that they believe 
are not being run as well as they could be. Even in cases where financial 
distress is not on the horizon, activist investors buy stock in what they view 
as underperforming companies and agitate for change.56 While the merits of 
 
53 For a discussion of the rise of differentiation between the covenants in the term loan and 
those in the revolver, see id. at 9-13. 
54 See Our History, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N, https://turnaround.org/about/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/C87K-DF7J] (last visited May 7, 2018). 
55 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 1233 n.72. 
56 For a discussion of hedge fund activism outside of the distress context, see Marcel Kahan & 
Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. 
REV. 134, 139-50 (2007), which attempts to “illustrate[] the potential bright side of hedge fund 
activism” through avenues such as corporate governance and corporate control activism. On the same 
subject, see Frank Partnoy, US Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER 
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such interventions remain the subject of debate, no one doubts that activist 
investors have changed the landscape of corporate governance.57 
II.  CONTROL RIGHTS INSIDE BANKRUPTCY 
The Bankruptcy Code by and large does not change the formal allocation 
of control rights. Chapter 11 creates a “debtor in possession.”58 Under this 
regime, the current managers run the day-to-day operations of the business, 
subject to the oversight of the board of directors. At the end of the bankruptcy 
proceeding, new securities are issued in the reorganized company and new 
shareholders—often the former debt holders—appear, along with new board 
members—often put in place by the new shareholders.59 As a formal legal 
matter, however, things remain in large part the same. The board and the 
managers retain control of the company, with the board being subject to 
removal by the shareholders.60 
The Bankruptcy Code does, however, provide a modest contraction in the 
free reign that the board and management normally enjoy in running the 
company. Under the Bankruptcy Code, various actions that a company could 
have taken on its own outside of bankruptcy require court approval. For 
example, a company does not need judicial authorization or shareholder 
approval outside of bankruptcy to borrow funds. Such a decision rests solely 
with the board and the managers of the company. Once the company invokes 
Chapter 11, however, the debtor needs court approval to borrow funds outside 
of the ordinary course of business.61 Along the same lines, a company outside 
of bankruptcy does not have to present its case to a judge or its stockholders if 
it wishes to sell some of its assets outside the ordinary course of business. To 
be sure, when the company wishes to sell all or substantially all of its assets 
 
POWER 101-09 (Jennifer Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015), which summarizes the history of hedge 
fund activism as well as its approach to the separation of voting and economic interests. 
57 The evidence to date generally supports the claim that hedge fund activism leads to shareholder 
gains. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1085, 1155 (2015) (noting that evidence suggests that activism is “followed by long-term improvements, 
rather than declines, in performance”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (finding, among other evidence, that “the market reacts 
favorably to activism, consistent with the view that it creates value”); C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second 
Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 
297-98 (2016) (enumerating scenarios in which hedge funds gain a positive reputation, primarily due 
to their financial resources and expertise). 
58 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). 
59 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 15, at 697-99 (describing Chapter 11 cases where old directors 
were replaced by new directors who were appointed by the new shareholders). 
60 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d 
60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he right to compel a shareholders’ meeting for the purpose of electing a 
new board subsists during reorganization proceedings.”). 
61 11 U.S.C. § 364(a)–(d). 
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outside of bankruptcy, it needs shareholder approval.62 However, decisions such 
as closing down a division and focusing on core aspects of the business fall 
within the board’s domain. The Bankruptcy Code, in contrast, requires that all 
sales outside of the ordinary course of business have to be blessed by the court.63 
When a court decides whether to approve the transactions that the 
managers wish to execute, it requires the managers to articulate a business 
justification for the proposed transaction.64 One may be tempted to think that 
this requirement lessens the board’s and management’s control rights of the 
firm in two ways. First, it opens up more transactions to judicial oversight 
than can be scrutinized outside of bankruptcy. Second, the requirement of 
articulating a business justification is a bit more intrusive than the normal 
business judgment rule that guides most corporate governance decisions.65 
Just as is the case outside of bankruptcy, focusing solely on the legal 
assignment of control rights inside of bankruptcy fails to capture the dynamic 
on the ground. Formal rules provide a modest check at best. While one 
consequence is the slight increase in judicial oversight of managerial 
decisionmaking, there is also the benefit of tighter constraints on outsiders 
who wish to influence the exercise of control. Perhaps most notably, filing for 
bankruptcy results in the imposition of an automatic stay, which prevents all 
attempts to collect money from the debtor. To the extent that part of the 
leverage that the lender had outside of bankruptcy was the threat to declare 
a default, this power is removed. Moreover, the stay prevents any effort to 
exercise control over property of the estate.66 
 
62 There is often extensive litigation surrounding the sale of a company outside of bankruptcy. 
Shareholders who believe that the sales price undervalues the company can seek appraisal rights. See, e.g., 
Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1551, 1558-59 (2014) (elaborating on the role of appraisal in U.S. corporate law, along with its 
statutory structure); see also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 
2017) (discussing the role that deal price should play in appraisal suits). Such appraisal suits do not affect 
whether or not the sale ultimately occurs. Alternatively, shareholders who are unhappy with the deal price 
can file a class action lawsuit against the board and allege that the directors violated their fiduciary duties. 
Such class actions occur in only about ten percent of takeover cases. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder 
Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1249 (2012). 
63 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
64 See, e.g., Institutional Creditors of Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l 
Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[F]or the debtor-in-possession or trustee 
to satisfy its fiduciary duty to the debtor, creditors and equity holders, there must be some articulated 
business justification for using, selling, or leasing the property outside the ordinary course of 
business.”); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 
(2d Cir. 1983) (advocating for a middle ground in bankruptcy court that “gives the bankruptcy judge 
considerable discretion yet requires him to articulate sound business justifications for his decisions”). 
65 See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van 
Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 675 (2002) (“The business judgment 
rule is perhaps best summarized as a ban against courts second-guessing the substantive quality of 
disinterested corporate directors’ decisions.”). 
66 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
2018] Taking Control Rights Seriously 1767 
At the end of the reorganization proceeding, at least as traditionally 
envisioned, control rights do shift. The plan of reorganization restructures the 
balance sheet of the company. To the extent that claims against the company 
are exchanged for equity claims, such an exchange could result in the former 
creditors gaining control of the company. It is the rare case where the initial 
shareholders retain a controlling equity interest in the reorganized firm. 
Over the years, however, creditors have devised ways to influence the 
debtor’s exercise of control rights even after the company has entered the 
Chapter 11 forum. As discussed above, one way that lenders exercise their 
influence over a borrower is to engineer the appointment of a CRO. The officer 
may report to the CEO or to the board. Either way, the CRO is positioned on 
the inside as an officer of the company. The automatic stay and other 
bankruptcy provisions that limit the effort of creditors therefore do not affect 
her. The automatic stay applies to outsiders, and she is an insider. Despite her 
status as part of the extant management team, the CRO’s authority and her 
loyalty remain intact even after a bankruptcy petition is filed. 
Another way lenders have been able to maintain their ability to influence 
the control rights of the debtor is through debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing.67 Just as the need for financing outside of bankruptcy enables 
lenders to insist on lending terms that allow them to exert power over the 
debtor, the need for financing inside of bankruptcy gives lenders, if anything, 
even greater power. Chapter 11 is an expensive affair, and many of the 
company’s normal financing needs remain throughout the process. Workers 
must be paid, inventory must be purchased, advertisements must be run, and 
rent must be paid. Added to these normal costs are the extraordinary costs of 
the restructuring process, namely the expenses accrued through hiring 
lawyers, investment bankers, accountants, and other professionals who 
contribute their expertise to the reorganization effort. Few companies that 
encounter financial distress have sufficient unencumbered assets to fund a 
Chapter 11 proceeding. Whatever cash they do have is often subject to lien of 
a senior creditor. The most likely source of new funds or the ability to use 
cash on hand that is part of the lenders’ collateral package therefore lies with 
the existing lenders.68 
The financing agreement for the DIP loan is negotiated before the company 
files for bankruptcy. The terms of the financing agreement can very well limit 
the board’s and management’s exercise of control rights. The agreement can 
limit the capital expenditures that the debtor can make. Indeed, it can go much 
 
67 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 1238-41 (summarizing the procedural elements of a DIP loan). 
68 See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 523 (2009) (finding that seventy-six percent of firms studied received either 
DIP financing or cash collateral orders). 
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further than the terms that we typically observe in credit agreements negotiated 
outside of bankruptcy. DIP financing agreements can actually mandate that the 
debtor take certain action; for example, the credit agreement may require that 
the debtor adhere to a strict budget.69 The agreement may also specify 
milestones for when a plan of reorganization has to be proposed. Actions that 
the secured lender views as problematic, such as the debtor losing the exclusive 
right to propose a plan of reorganization, can constitute a default under the 
DIP lending agreement. In some cases, the financing agreement can specify 
that if certain benchmarks are not met, the company will be put up for auction. 
Through these various provisions, the DIP lenders shape the pace and the path 
of the Chapter 11 proceeding. 
Recent years have seen continued evolution in the ways in which lenders 
can influence a company’s exercise of control rights in its transition into the 
bankruptcy forum. Most notable is the rise of plan support agreements and 
restructuring support agreements.70 These agreements delineate the way in 
which the Chapter 11 proceeding will progress. Major decisions as to how a 
case will proceed are made before the case is filed. The agreements are 
contracts among the debtor and various creditor constituencies entered into 
in advance of, and in contemplation of, a bankruptcy filing. The major 
parties—usually the secured creditors and, if they are not the holders of the 
fulcrum security, then the fulcrum security holder, and the debtor—negotiate 
the contours of a plan of restructuring in advance of a bankruptcy filing. 
Lenders have substantial leverage in these negotiations, and the outcome is 
an agreement whereby the signing parties agree to support a plan. The 
agreement specifies the jurisdiction where the petition is going to be filed, 
the timetable for the reorganization, and the terms of the reorganization. 
A recent example is Cumulus Media, one of the largest owners and 
operators of AM and FM stations in the United States.71 The company had 
over $2.3 billion in debt.72 While it was generating sufficient revenues to fund 
 
69 See id. at 525 (finding that seventy-two percent of loans “impose specific line-item budgets 
. . . [which] obligate the firm to submit detailed evidence of cash receipts and expenditures”). 
70 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593, 603 (2017) 
(“Over the last decade, secured creditors have also discovered that they could increase their control 
over the debtor in a different fashion—through the use of restructuring support agreements. 
Restructuring support agreements are a natural outgrowth of the Bankruptcy Code’s affirmative 
commitment to prepackaged bankruptcies.”); David Skeel & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy 
Shift to a Contract Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777 (2018). 
71 See Declaration of John F. Abbot in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions 
at 3, In re Cumulus Media, Inc., No. 17-13381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Declaration 
of John Abbot] (“Cumulus Media is a leader in the radio broadcasting industry, reaching 245 million 
people each week through their owned-and-operated stations . . . .”). 
72 Id. at 12. 
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its operations, it could not service its debt.73 The cash that it generated was 
subject to the senior lenders’ security interest. Cumulus attempted to 
restructure its debt outside of bankruptcy, but the efforts failed.74 It then 
turned to the bankruptcy system as an alternative way to adjust its 
obligations. Cumulus, along with an ad hoc group of senior lenders, crafted a 
plan to reduce its outstanding debt by roughly $1 billion and transfer the bulk 
of the stock in the new entity to the senior lenders.75 The agreement specified 
when and where the bankruptcy petition would be filed.76 The agreement also 
stipulated that the debtor would be allowed to use the lenders’ cash collateral 
to fund itself, the plan that would be proposed, the date on which the plan 
and the disclosure statement would be filed, the date by which the plan would 
be confirmed, and the method by which a new board of directors would be 
selected.77 While junior creditors who were not part of the Restructuring 
Support Agreement challenged some aspects of the plan—looking, in essence, 
to increase the payout that the proposed plan gave them—the Restructuring 
Support Agreement dictated the timing and the pace of the Chapter 11 
proceeding. Cumulus followed the prescribed script, reduced its debt, and 
left Chapter 11 less than six months after it filed its bankruptcy petition.78 
III. CONTRACTING FOR CONTROL 
It is thus clear that lenders can use the provisions of their credit 
agreements to greatly influence the exercise of the control rights that rest 
with a borrower’s board and managers. This power exists both inside and 
outside of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Given that lenders have this 
power, why do we not see contracts that expressly transfer control rights to 
the lender? Such a transfer could take many forms. A default could allow a 
lender to place a representative on the board, give the lender the legal right 
to replace a majority of the board, give the lender the power to remove the 
CEO, or give the lender the right to initiate the sale of parts or all of the 
 
73 Id. at 19. 
74 Id. at 19-20. 
75 See Case Profile: Cumulus Media RSA Hands 83.5% of Equity to TL Holders, DEBTWIRE (Nov. 30, 
2017), https://www.debtwire.com/info/case-profile-cumulus-media-rsa-hands-835-equity-tl-holders 
[https://perma.cc/XB8R-59KN] (“Under the proposed treatment, the term loan lenders would get a 
USD 1.3bn first lien term loan and 83.5% of the company’s reorganized equity.”). 
76 The Restructuring Support Agreement can be found as an attachment to the first day 
declaration of John F. Abbot. See Declaration of John Abbot, supra note 71, at 64-92. 
77 See id. at 66-67. 
78 Emerging from Chapter 11, Cumulus Turns Page on a New Chapter, INSIDERADIO (June 5, 
2018), www.insideradio.com/emerging-from-chapter-cumulus-turns-page-on-new-chapter/article_ 
b6193d3c-6882-11e8-85d1-0b7d91a4acdb.html [https://perma.cc/382U-RZGE] (reporting the 
company “did pretty much what it first said it would” when it filed and emerged from bankruptcy 
“a few weeks ahead of schedule”). 
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company. Credit agreements are complex and creative documents. Over the 
years the drafters of these documents have developed a myriad of ways to 
protect the lenders’ investment in the debtor. There is no end to the 
innovation that one could imagine when it comes to creating provisions that 
shift control, but lending agreements lack such arrangements.79 
It is not that such terms are beyond the imagination of today’s lawyers 
and investors. In the venture capital context, we do see contracts providing 
that, if the borrower fails to meet certain targets, the private equity sponsor 
has the right to appoint a certain number of directors to the board and thus 
gain control of the company.80 Yet we do not see such explicit transfer of 
control in the public company world. Control rights remain formally vested 
in the board and the managers while investors are left seeking to influence 
the exercise of these rights.81 Lenders contract expressly over cash flow rights 
but act indirectly when it comes to control rights. 
One explanation for this difference between cash flow rights and control 
rights may simply be that the parties do not want deals that contract expressly 
over control rights. Perhaps the optimal allocation of such rights is for the 
board and the management team to always retain formal control of the 
company and for the lenders to act on a more indirect basis. The reason for 
being circumspect over control could be that giving formal control rights to 
lenders upon certain triggering events would raise the specter of 
opportunistic behavior. Recent experience has demonstrated that activist 
investors consider buying debt and exerting leverage as part of their business 
plan.82 A board and management team could therefore legitimately be 
concerned that if a debt contract contained various control rights that could 
be exercised directly by the lending group in certain circumstances, these 
 
79 At least two prominent reform proposals tie cash flow rights to control rights by having a 
default trigger that converts the lowest priority of debt. See Adler, supra note 18, at 325 (“If . . . a 
default were sufficiently significant or prolonged to trigger a transformation, the firm would 
automatically extinguish both the equity class and the fixed claims of at least the class with the next 
lowest priority.”); Note, supra note 18, at 1858 (“[C]ontracts should automatically rearrange troubled 
capital structures by providing for a mandatory conversion of debt to equity as debtors reach 
specified distress thresholds.”). 
80 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 1218-19 (“Control rights shift, however, when 
things go poorly for the start-up. When the enterprise cannot find its footing, the principal question 
becomes whether the project should continue . . . , be sold . . . , or be shut down . . . . [T]he venture 
capitalist is almost always vested with the shutdown decision when the business struggles.”). 
81 Anthony Casey identifies one exception to this typical pattern. He notes that when the stock 
of the enterprise’s subsidiaries is held in a holding company, the lender can take a pledge of the stock 
and, if there is a default, have the stock transferred to them, giving them de jure control over the 
subsidiaries. Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ 
Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2721-23 (2015). 
82 See An Introduction to Distressed Debt and Credit Investing, CAIS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.caisgroup
.com/blog/an-introduction-to-distressed-debt-and-credit-investing [https://perma.cc/S53C-4V52]. 
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aggressive investors could well buy a sufficient amount of the debt and 
attempt to trigger the ability to exercise control. Any attempt to specify when 
control shifts ex ante could well be inefficient ex post. Getting matters 
precisely right is difficult. The current environment allows for broad 
covenants that specify default, with default triggering a conversation rather 
than an automatic shift in control. Given the inability to perfectly tailor 
control rights contracts in advance, one could speculate that the current 
allocation—of debt contracts formally setting out cash flow rights and only 
creating the power to influence control rights externally—is optimal.83 
To illustrate the point, consider a firm that has assets of $100 and debt of 
$80. Assume that there is a provision in the lending agreement stipulating that 
if the value of the company decreases to $85, the lender gains the right to replace 
the board with directors of its own choosing. If this provision is exercised and 
the lender retains the same debt claim, it has control but may now be in favor 
of an inefficient liquidation. The liquidation bias of those holding debt claims 
is well known.84 To ensure that bias does not exist, the lender needs both to 
gain control of the company and to either cash out or dilute the existing 
shareholders. One could imagine a contract that provides both that the lender 
exercises control and that this exercise in and of itself automatically changes 
cash flow rights. Nonetheless, such transfer of cash flow rights along with the 
contractual shift in control would heighten the threat of opportunism, in which 
control rights are exercised with the simple aim of wiping out the equity and 
transferring value to the debt holder. It takes little imagination to posit a hedge 
fund whose investment thesis would be to search for investments where the 
governing documents allow for a change of control and shift in cash flow rights. 
Indeed, to the extent that such a shift can extract value from the shareholders, 
so much the better from the fund’s vantage point. 
Perhaps the balance between borrowers and lenders has reached an 
acceptable compromise. Creditors have developed ways, though often 
cumbersome, to affect the exercise of control rights. By not allowing 
creditors to grab formal control too quickly and making it expensive for 
lenders to assert their rights under the lending agreement in full, the 
current landscape guards against creditor opportunism. Such a Panglossian 
take on the current state of affairs would suggest that parties might hesitate 
to write contracts on control rights. 
 
83 The point in text is similar to the observation of Professors Scott and Triantis that, in drafting 
contracts, there is a tradeoff between clear terms ex ante and litigation ex post. See Robert E. Scott & 
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822-39 (2006). 
84 Ayotte and Morrison present evidence suggesting that senior lenders with control tend to 
favor liquidation. See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 68, at 520-21, 538 (finding that traditional 
reorganization occurred in only thirty-two percent of cases and that the entire firm was sold off in 
sixty-six percent of cases). 
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Yet there are other reasons that explain the absence of control right 
contracts. There are both agency-cost reasons and legal reasons that suggest 
a hesitancy in contracting directly on control. Agency-cost reasons often lead 
current management to disfavor such contracts, whereas legal landmines 
suggest why a lender may well hesitate before negotiating for such provisions. 
First, most people on a company’s management team derive private 
benefits from their continued employment with the firm. They enjoy both 
future salary as well as psychic benefits from their jobs. All things being equal, 
they would not endorse a course of action that could increase the risk of them 
losing their jobs.85 Under the current regime, when a company agrees to a 
covenant that grants cash flow rights to a lender, the company leaders know 
that there is a chance that the company will violate the covenant and thus be 
forced into negotiations with the lender about either getting a waiver of the 
default or an amendment to the credit agreement. The lender, however, does 
not have the direct power to replace the management team with one more to 
its own liking. This dynamic would change were the lender and the company 
to contract on control rights. Running afoul of such provisions could well lead 
to a quick exit from the company for the extant managers. For this reason, 
when choosing between contractual provisions tied to cash flow rights and 
those tied to control rights, the borrower’s management would prefer the 
former to the latter. 
It is not just management and its understandable fear of removal that may 
explain the lack of contracting on control. Lenders have their own reason to 
shy away from such terms. At first blush, one may think that lenders would 
value contractually based control rights as an effective means of protecting 
their investment. Rather than having to use the sword of Damocles in the 
form of a threatened declaration of default to nudge a company to move in 
the direction they wish, lenders could issue such orders directly. 
As attractive as this may be in theory, in practice lenders worry that 
exercising too much control over the borrower raises the risks of lender liability 
and equitable subordination. If the lender takes actual control of the company 
and runs the company to further the lender’s interest, it risks being hit with a 
lender liability law suit. In the past, lenders have been held liable for exercising 
too much control over the debtor. For example, in State National Bank of El Paso 
v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,86 a court affirmed a judgment of roughly $19 million 
 
85 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 277, 282 (1991) (“[M]anagers equate firm liquidation with financial ‘ruin.’ Since 
liquidation is harmful to managers’ job prospects, reputation, and self-respect, they seek to minimize 
the probability of its occurrence . . . .”). 
86 678 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Tex. App. 1984), appeal dismissed per stipulation. See also K.M.C. Co. 
v. Irving Tr. Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming that the implied obligation of good 
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against a bank that was the lead bank on the loan to the borrower. The bank 
had lost confidence in the company’s prior CEO, and the CEO was replaced. 
When the company ran into financial distress, the old CEO sought to reclaim 
his position. The bank vetoed such efforts, putting its allies on the board.87 The 
court affirmed a jury finding that the bank had not acted in good faith and that, 
had the former CEO rather than his bank-selected replacement been in charge, 
the company would have been worth about $19 million more than it was at the 
time of suit.88 
There are, of course, cases that provide some comfort to lenders. Many 
courts have held that if the lender cuts square corners and adheres to the 
terms of its credit agreement, it cannot be held liable.89 While the cases where 
a lender has been held liable for its treatment of the borrower are rare, it 
remains standard practice for law firms to remind their clients to avoid 
situations that could lead to a lender liability suit.90 
Lender liability is not the only risk a lender who contracts directly for control 
could face. Looming perhaps even larger is the doctrine of equitable 
subordination. Under this line of cases, if a creditor exerts undue influence over 
the debtor, the court can lower the priority status of the creditor’s claim should 
the borrower end up in a bankruptcy proceeding.91 The effect of such 
 
faith may have required the lender to give notice to the borrower before it exercised its discretion 
under a lending agreement to not advance funds). 
87 See Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 667-68. 
88 See id. at 685 (“Acceleration clauses are not to be used offensively such as for the commercial 
advantage of the creditor. They do not permit acceleration when the facts make its use unjust or oppressive.”). 
89 See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (“Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to 
the great discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of ‘good faith.’”). 
90 See, e.g., Eugene C. Kim & Gina Giang, Lender Liability: Taking Stock in an Uncertain Time, ABA COM. 
L. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Section of Bus. Law, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2009, at 9, available at https://www.sheppa
rdmullin.com/media/article/713_Lender%20Liability%20Article%20-%20Eugene%20Kim.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J37Q-EJE4] (warning clients that it is “difficult to predict which path lender liability law will take in the future”). 
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2012) (“[T]he court may . . . under principles of equitable subordination, 
subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed 
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest . . . .”); Taylor v. Standard 
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939) (“[T]he court, in approving a plan, was authorized and required 
. . . to recognize the rights and the status of the preferred stockholders arising out of Standard’s wrongful 
and injurious conduct in the mismanagement of Deep Rock’s affairs.”); Helen Davis Chaitman, The 
Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 BUS. LAW. 1561, 1562 (1984) (“[C]ourts have subordinated bank 
claims in two situations: first, where the bank has participated in . . . fraudulent conduct; and second, where 
the bank has taken control of the debtor, thus assuming the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder, 
and then breached those duties to the injury of general creditors.”); Allan L. Hill & Nickolas Karavolas, 
Equitable Subordination Considerations for Creditors, LAW 360 (July 2015, 10:19 AM), https:/
/www.law360.com/articles/674223/equitable-subordination-considerations-for-creditors [https://perma
.cc/G8NB-3SRJ] (listing the conditions for equitable subordination as “(1) the creditor must have engaged 
in . . . inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct must have resulted in injury to other creditors of the 
bankrupt party or conferred an unfair advantage on the creditor; and (3) equitable subordination must not 
be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
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subordination can be extreme. A subordinated lender can go from having its 
claim paid in full to a position where it receives only a fraction of what it is owed. 
The message of these two doctrines is clear: vigorous efforts on the part of 
lenders to take formal control over the affairs of the borrower entail substantial 
risks. In light of this, it is no surprise that lenders tend not to contract directly 
for control rights. Moreover, when trying to use terms of the lending agreement 
as leverage to influence the debtor’s exercise of control rights, lenders endeavor 
to stick as closely as possible to the terms of their agreement.92 
There is yet another constraint on lenders exercising control that derives 
directly from the Bankruptcy Code. Some provisions of the Code have special 
provisions for “insiders.” Most notably, the reach-back period for preference 
law is extended from ninety days to one year for insiders.93 In the Winstar 
bankruptcy, a creditor who exercised power under its lending agreement was 
treated as an insider, even though it did not exercise actual control over the 
debtor.94 Existence of formal control would almost assuredly turn an outside 
creditor into an insider for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Lenders 
understandably pause before taking actions that would put an extra nine 
months of payments at risk of being set aside as preferential. 
In total, the legal impediments to contracting on control rights are 
formidable. Coordination costs also inhibit contracting on control. When a 
creditor seeks to lend money to a company, the Article 9 filing system and 
real estate filing systems alert the putative lender to prior lenders who may 
have already staked their claim to priority. Searching these systems is 
relatively easy. As of now, however, there is no analogous system whereby a 
lender can alert third parties that it has a claim for contingent control rights. 
Ensuring that the borrower has not promised to give multiple lenders the 
same right of control is no small matter. 
That said, we cannot state with any degree of confidence what contracts 
would be written if the various impediments to contracting on control were 
removed. Few, if any, would have predicted at the outset of the syndicated 
lending market that we would see the type of provisions that we see today. One 
way to take tentative steps toward contracts over control rights would be to 
allow borrowers and lenders to remove some of the hurdles in their way. One 
 
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893 F.2d 693, 
699-700 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the control used by Associates over Clark’s finances did not 
“rise[] to the level of unconscionable conduct necessary to justify the application of the doctrine of 
equitable subordination . . . because . . . pursuant to its loan agreement with Clark, Associates had 
the right to reduce funding, just as it did, as Clark’s sales slowed”). 
93 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
94 Schubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 396-97 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[I]t is not necessary that a non-statutory insider have actual control; rather, the question is whether there 
is a close relationship [between debtor and creditor] and . . . anything other than closeness to suggest that 
any transactions were not conducted at arm’s length.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2018] Taking Control Rights Seriously 1775 
could imagine allowing companies to specify, in their charters, that they waive 
their ability to bring lender liability lawsuits. Along the same lines, a lender 
could insist that all of the borrower’s contracts with other creditors contain a 
provision whereby the creditor waives its right to attempt to equitably 
subordinate the first lender’s claim should the borrower end up in Chapter 11. 
Allowing a company to include in its charter a provision that would limit 
future lawsuits is by no means unprecedented. In 2000, Delaware amended 
its corporate law so that a company could, in its charter, waive the corporate 
opportunity doctrine.95 That doctrine, as a part of the duty of loyalty, forbade 
corporate fiduciaries from taking new business projects without first offering 
them to the company. Other states followed Delaware’s lead. Presented with 
this new degree of freedom, hundreds of companies adopted such waivers.96 
While there has been only one empirical study of the efficiency effects of such 
adoptions, the preliminary results demonstrate that the waivers are positive 
for the investors in the company. The fact that companies are willing to 
embrace new contracts when legal prohibitions are lifted and the fact that 
such innovations seem to have a positive effect suggests that lenders and 
borrowers should be allowed to contract around those legal prohibitions that 
today discourage contracting over control rights. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a bifurcated world. Credit agreements contract directly on cash 
flow rights. While credit agreements can constrain the actions that a borrower 
can take, they do not give control rights to the lenders. Lenders, however, 
have been able to find various and sundry ways to draft contracts that allow 
them to exercise power over the decisions that the company makes. Like 
much of corporate law, this state of affairs is the result of history, economics, 
and politics.97 Were one to build a financing system from the ground up, it is 
unclear that one would insist on restricting the contracting space in such ways 
as it is limited today. It is, of course, often perilous to replace an extant system 
with a new one out of whole cloth. The costs incurred in the transition from 
the old system to the new one could exceed the gains that the new system 
would generate. Yet one need not make wholesale changes. Instead, the 
introduction of incremental ways for opening up the contracting space in 
lending agreements, allowing firms to opt out of the constraints that inhibit 
 
95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2018). 
96 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1078-79 (2017). 
97 See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 283-87 (1994) (discussing how these factors have 
shaped the general contours of American corporate law). 
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contracting on control rights, could lead to innovations that would benefit 
borrowers and lenders alike. 
 
